Package downsizing is a practice where the package content is reduced without changing the package or the price of the product. In a market that is defined by ‘hyper-competition,’ package downsizing is often practiced by marketers to effect an invisible price increase for their products. Although marketers may maintain that providing, the legally required, quantity indication on the package is adequate for customers to make logical and informed choices, research indicates that consumers often do not consult quantity indications on packages (...) but use alternative methods (e.g., visual impressions of the package size, total package price, or previous purchase experience) to judge product quantity and to calculate product value. As a subtle means, package downsizing therefore has the potential to mislead customers in the buying process due to an unfavorable balance of information within the dyad. This could give rise to serious moral and ethical consideration. In this paper, we examined various issues related to package downsizing, such as why sellers resort to this type of practice, consumer vulnerability to package downsizing, as well as the extent of protection offered to consumers by the existing laws and regulations with respect to product packaging. Finally, we examined the ethics of package downsizing using the existing legal, moral, and professional ethical standards as well as the principle of equivalence. Our analysis indicates that package downsizing, as it is practiced by the marketers and sellers today, is unethical as far as the consumers are concerned. (shrink)

Society has historically not taken a benign view of genetic disease. The laws permitting sterilization of the mentally re tarded~ and those proscribing consanguineous marriages are but two examples. Indeed as far back as the 5th-10th centuries, B.C.E., consanguineous unions were outlawed (Leviticus XVIII, 6). Case law has traditionally tended toward the conservative. It is reactive rather than directive, exerting its influence only after an individual or group has sustained injury and brought suit. In contrast, state legislatures have not been (...) inhibited in enacting statutes. Many of their products can be characterized as hasty, unnecessary, ill-conceived, and based on the heart rather than the head. Moreover the lack of expert consultation sought has also been remarkable. One state legislature, for example, has advocated immunization for sickle cell anemia! Many others have enacted laws for the screening of inborn errors of metabolism, e.g., phenylketon uria, but have poorly defined the lines of responsibility to secure compliance. A spate of specific disease-related bills has emerged in the u.S. Congress, each seeking recognition and appropriations. Sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, Cooley's anemia and Tay-Sachs disease have been among the front-runners for support. Finally, in 1975, Congress has begun to examine an omnibus bill concerning all forms of genetic disease. The bill, termed the National Genetic Diseases Act is, however, still far from being enacted. (shrink)

As healthcare providers engage in the politics of reforming and humanizing our immigration and asylum “system” it is critical that they are able to refer their patients whose health is directly impacted by our immigration laws and policies to experts who can help them navigate the system and obtain the healthcare they need.

This paper examines Hans Kelsen’s Communist Theory of Law in the context of his general critique of natural law theories. Kelsen argues that since there is no such thing as objectively determined natural law, a theory that attempts to use it to establish constraints on positive law is at risk of automatically justifying the latter. Kelsen deploys this ‘Pandora’s Box Objection’ in his characterisation of the Communist theory of law as the ‘handmaiden’ of the Soviet government that conserved, rather than (...) challenged, oppressive policies. The Objection is limited in scope. Firstly, it applies only to ‘forward-looking’ Communist theories of law that justify transitional socialist legal arrangements rather than seek to abolish the legal form as a whole. Secondly, it does not eliminate the Rule of Law constraints that are independent from natural law fetters – hence the state does not have a ‘blank cheque’ to introduce any positive law. (shrink)

Julia Annas explores how Plato's account of the relation of virtue to law developed, and how his ideas were taken up by Cicero and by Philo of Alexandria. She shows that, rather than rejecting the account given in his Republic, Plato develops in the Laws a more careful and sophisticated version of that account.

This conversation between two scholars of international law focuses on the contemporary realities of feminist analysis of international law and on current and future spaces of resistance. It notes that feminism has moved from the margin towards the centre, but that this has also come at a cost. As the language of women’s rights and gender equality has travelled into the international policy worlds of crisis management and peace and security, feminist scholars need to become more careful in their analysis (...) and find new ways of resistance. While noting that we live in dangerous times, this is also a hopeful discussion. (shrink)

This article locates a theoretical reflection on the form of legal subjectivity against twenty-first century complexities and pressures, including the structural complexities visible in biotechnological developments, new hybridities and numerous contemporary theoretical and practical manifestations of heterogeneity, multiplicity and complexity emerging in a range of disciplines, including cybernetics, techno-theory, post-humanism and ecology. The author defends the theoretical and critical utility of understanding the legal subject as an explicit (and explicitly limited ) constructus . Criticising the constructed naturalism (and the historical (...) and contemporary exclusions) of the 'human being' of law, the author suggests that the language and concept of the 'legal entity' (rather than that of the 'legal person') draws attention to the patterned 'gap' between law and life (and to related injustices enacted by the form of the materialisation of legal subjectivity) while simultaneously providing the degree of theoretical plasticity now required by the mutable complexities of the twenty-first century and beyond. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the theory of international law. In analytic jurisprudence, at least since the latter half of the twentieth century, the primary debate in general jurisprudence has been between legal positivism and its most ardent critic, Ronald Dworkin. The positivist tradition is represented here by its two most important theorists, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. During their careers, Kelsen and Hart clashed over the best understanding of legal positivism. For his part, Dworkin devoted the bulk of his critical attention (...) to Hart's work. The chapter also focuses on the way in which each theorist builds his view of international law against the background of a more general jurisprudence. Hart argues that the differences between international law and municipal law might eventually be overcome. International law might be in a stage of transition that will bring it nearer in structure to a municipal system. (shrink)

I begin with some points from the Republic which are familiar, perhaps over-familiar, to everyone, and then raise an issue about the role of law in Kallipolis which points us to something not so familiar. I hope that this contribution to honoring Fred Miller will lead to the kind of discussion that his own work has stimulated over the years, across an incredibly wide range of topics. I am honored and delighted to contribute to honoring Fred, and hope that this (...) paper will be worthy of its inclusion in this collection. (shrink)

Many studies have deduced subterranean dialogues between Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt from indirect evidence. This article uses new evidence from marginalia in Arendt’s copy of Nomos of the Earth and finds that she formed, but never published, an incisive critique of Schmitt’s geopolitics. Through an analysis of Arendt’s comments on the topics of soil, conquest, and contract, I show that Arendt deemed Schmitt’s theory to be imperialist and in contradiction with itself. Her reading of Schmitt prompts important new questions (...) regarding the scholarly use of Schmitt’s conception of nomos as a tool of critique against American empire in the post-9/11 era. The marginalia also suggests, against past scholarship, that Arendt thought justice should play a central role in politics. I propose that we look to Arendt’s own conception of nomos, which she developed later, in order to form an alternative geopolitics. Because of her focus on intersubjective world-building, Arendt’s nomos embraces contract and promise-mak... (shrink)

With this issue George Annas contributes his last At Law to the Hastings Center Report. Since the column was inaugurated in 1976 as Law and the Life Sciences, George has charted the course of biomedical ethics in the courts, challenging readers to come to grips with an emerging body of law in provocative analyses of critical decisions. As he retires from this column we wish him well, and look forward to his continued contributions to our pages. In bidding farewell to (...) one friend we are nonetheless pleased to welcome another as Alexander Morgan Capron, Henry W. Bruce University Professor of Law and Medicine at the University of Southern California and codirector of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics, joins the Report in the September‐October issue as a regular contributor to this column. Prof. Capron, formerly executive director of The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, is a distinguished scholar and writer well known to our readers. We welcome the opportunity to share his insights on issues before courts and legislatures nationwide. (shrink)

Relational approaches are gaining more and more importance in philosophy of tech-nology. This brings up the critical question of how they can be implemented in applied ethics, law, and practice. In “Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics”, Nancy S. Jecker (2024) comments on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024), in which I present a deep relational, “eco-relational approach”. In this reply, I address two of Jecker’s criticisms: in section. 3, I (...) deal with the connection of personhood and human identity with relationality, and in section. 4, I discuss the consequences of relational approaches for practical ethics and law. Unlike Jecker, I am strongly convinced that relational approaches can and should be implemented in applied ethics and law. (shrink)

BackgroundThe U.S. Food and Drug Administration traditionally has kept confidential significant amounts of information relevant to the approval or non-approval of specific drugs, devices, and biologics and about the regulatory status of such medical products in FDA’s pipeline.ObjectiveTo develop practical recommendations for FDA to improve its transparency to the public that FDA could implement by rulemaking or other regulatory processes without further congressional authorization. These recommendations would build on the work of FDA’s Transparency Task Force in 2010.MethodsIn 2016-2017, we convened (...) a team of academic faculty from Harvard Medical School, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Yale Medical School, Yale Law School, and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health to develop recommendations through an iterative process of reviewing FDA’s practices, considering the legal and policy constraints on FDA in expanding transparency, and obtaining insights from independent observers of FDA.ResultsThe team developed 18 specific recommendations for improving FDA’s transparency to the public. FDA could adopt all these recommendations without further congressional action.FundingThe development of the Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration was funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War JusticeAnna Floerke ScheidAfter the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War Justice Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2010. 220 pp. $20.00Beginning with Ezekiel’s imagery of a field filled with dry bones in the aftermath of war, Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright approach the burgeoning question of how best to (...) establish a just peace following violent conflict. As theologians committed to the Christian tradition’s emphasis on restoring peace following warfare, their project develops jus post bellum categories that have thus far been considered more by philosophers, political scientists, and international law scholars than by theologians. The authors see themselves as extending the work of Glen Stassen and other just peacemaking theorists. Where just peacemaking provides theologically rooted criteria for jus ante bellum, Allman and Winright want to root theologically jus post bellum. “We believe that expanding the just war tradition to encompass jus post bellum will actually ‘close the loop’ or make for a more honest just war theory by bringing us back to the practices of just peacemaking” (55–56).The book is presented in two parts. The first part offers an overview of the history of the just war tradition and of the emerging discussion of jus post bellum. Despite its brevity, a key strength of this overview is its comprehensiveness. Allman and Winright illustrate the tradition’s roots in Hellenistic philosophy, its development by patristic and medieval theologians, and finally its adoption in the secular sphere. The authors then uncover nascent elements of jus post bellum throughout the just war tradition. Here they pay particular attention to Immanuel Kant before turning to contemporary philosophers, including perhaps the most well-known jus post bellum theorist, Brian Orend, with whom the authors dialogue extensively in the second part.The second part constitutes the book’s major constructive contribution to the theological ethics of warfare and conflict resolution. The authors posit four “categories” that they argue are “consistent with the Christian just war tradition” and necessary for a just peace following war (85). First, they contend that the just cause, which prompts the war, must be reconsidered jus post bellum. “The logic is simple and clear: the end of a just war must be accomplishing the objectives that served as the grounds for going to war in the first place” (100). Second, the authors explore the need for postconflict reconciliation, arguing [End Page 223] for restorative forms of justice alongside retributive forms. This chapter would benefit from more extensive dialogue with theologians such as John de Gruchy, Robert Schreiter, and Charles Villa-Vicencio, who have devoted themselves to the topics of reconciliation and restorative justice from the Christian perspective. Third, the authors discuss the value of punishment in establishing justice. Their discussion of the symbolic importance of reparations is especially insightful. The authors suggest that “reparations require a reversal of power. Those who once were dominant are now in a submissive/vulnerable position” in relation to those who were once powerless (130). Finally, the authors propose a “restoration phase” following warfare wherein basic security must be established and political reforms enacted to preclude any return to the status quo ante bellum. The victors must ensure the economic recovery of the vanquished; provide for the needs of the war’s most vulnerable victims, such as children; and clean up environmental hazards that resulted from fighting.The book is most impressive in that it conjoins multiple postconflict endeavors (e.g., reconciliation and war crimes tribunals) that are frequently separated or seen as oppositional in other literature. This strength indicates that the book may continue to yield serious contributions to the ethics of conflict resolution, especially as scholars accept the authors’ challenge to “develop and further refine” the categories they propose.Anna Floerke ScheidDuquesne UniversityCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Graffiti and Colonial Unknowing:A Comment on Mishuana Goeman's "Caring for Landscapes of Justice in Perilous Settler Environments"Anna Cookin "caring for landscapes of justice in Perilous Settler Environments," Dr. Goeman shows how the NDN Collective's initiatives, Chemehuevi photographer Cara Romero's Tongvaland project, and the works of Gabrieliño Tongva artist Mercedes Dorame "exemplify communities of care" that work toward "the unmapping of settler terrains" ("Caring for Landscapes" 51). Her address (...) highlights how these cartographic art productions are processes of (re)mapping that challenge colonial spatialities. Drawing on Michi Saagig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson's poem "i am graffiti," Goeman frames these art works as Indigenous graffiti, insofar as they are everyday acts of resurgence1 that resist erasure and enact rematriation.My comments aim to articulate how Romero's and Dorame's works both reveal and disrupt a colonial unknowing by showing the cracks of settler colonial spatiality. I take Goeman's address to illustrate that the changing of minds and unsettling of settler identity will not occur through argumentation, facts, and figures alone, but rather through aesthetic and cartographic practices that "provide a way of seeing Indigenous futurities and relationalities" ("Caring for Landscapes" 52).Maps as Tools of Settler ColonialismIn order to highlight how these art practices enact a kind of (re)mapping that breaks through the veneer of colonial permanence, we first need to consider the way mapping transforms land into property in the service of Indigenous erasure and land dispossession. In her address, Goeman offers a short history of what is now called Los Angeles through the lens of dispossession that occurs through "international claiming of property and burgeoning US property law" ("Caring for Landscapes" 53). Tovaangar was divided into Spanish (and [End Page 64] then Mexican) land grants that, after 1846, were "registered under the US as property" (Goeman, "Caring for Landscapes" 53; emphasis added). The Land Act of 1851 "established the domestication of the California landscape under US governance" by legitimating existing Mexican land rights and mapping out territory yet "unclaimed" ("Caring for Landscapes" 54). The mapping of this so-called "unclaimed" territory propelled a violent erasure of California Indians by "establishing new and ongoing commerce centers" ("Caring for Landscapes" 53). Land was transferred into property—as a thing owned—without "the consent of those who … lived on the land since time immemorial, following the settler structure of passing land between Christian nations" ("Caring for Landscapes" 53). By showing how property rights legitimate conquest and violence, Goeman illustrates how mapping has been (and continues to be) an "essential settler-colonial tool to domesticate land in Southern California and propel development" ("Caring for Landscapes" 54). While she demonstrates how the mapping of Tovaangar using 493 hand-drawn Diseños maps served to sever Indigenous communities (and their relationships with land, such as the Gabrieliño Tongva with the San Gabriel Mountains), she emphasizes that this is an ongoing process that has not been left in a distant past. Newer maps that may seem more objective and scientific with "better models of scale or a more realist representation" remain, at their core, maps of dispossession ("Caring for Landscapes" 54).The very desire to objectively determine location by assigning latitude and longitude reveals a colonial spatiality, which "territorialize[s] the physical landscape by manufacturing categories and separating land from people" and conceives of space in terms of property logics (Goeman, "[Re]Mapping Indigenous Presence" 296). In addition to Indigenous land dispossession, this colonial spatiality rejects relationality by creating dualist boundaries between human and non-human, in which land is the raw material for human development and the creation of culture. Cherokee philosopher Brian Burkhart speaks of relationality in terms of locality, which he defines as "being-fromthe-land, knowing-from-the-land, and meaning-from-the-land" (Indigenizing Philosophy xvii). The severing of locality can be understood in terms of the transformation of land as relative to inert matter to be acted upon. Mapping serves as a tool of settler colonial erasure insofar as it delocalizes "land as the relational ground of kinship" into "land as a mere object that only has meaning or value in relation to people" ("Indigenizing Philosophy... (shrink)

In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggests that people are not harmed by being conceived with a disease or disability if they could not have existed without suffering that particular condition. He nevertheless contends that entities can be harmed if the suffering they experience is sufficiently severe. By implication, there is a threshold which divides harmful from non-harmful conceptions. The assumption that such a threshold exists has come to play a part in UK policy making. I argue that (...) Parfit’s distinction between harmful and non-harmful conceptions is untenable. Drawing on Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument for God’s existence, I suggest that the act of creation cannot be identical with the act of harming—nor indeed of benefiting—however great the offspring’s suffering may be. I suggest that Parfit is right that bringing children into existence does not usually harm them, but I argue that this must be applied to all conceptions, since Parfit cannot show how the harm threshold can be operationalised. If we think certain conceptions are unethical or should be illegal, this must be on other grounds than that the child is harmed by them. I show that a Millian approach in this context fails to exemplify the empirical and epistemological advantages which are commonly associated with it, and that harm-based legislation would need to be based on broader harm considerations than those relating to the child who is conceived. (shrink)

In late 2003, the Canadian media reported that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would start offering arbitration in family disputes in accordance with both Islamic legal principles and Ontario's Arbitration Act of 1991. A vociferous two-year debate ensued on the introduction of “Sharia law” in Ontario. This article analyzes representations of Muslim women's agency that came to the fore in this debate by examining reports in three Canadian newspapers. The debate demonstrated two notions of agency. The predominant perspective conceptualized (...) Muslim women's agency as their ability to resist domination, tying secularization to agency. A second strain of the debate portrayed agency as embedded in intersecting social forces of domination and subordination. The first perspective homogenized diverse Muslim communities, fostering the gendered racialization of these communities. Understanding agency as embedded, by contrast, enabled conceptualizations of Muslim women as agentic religious subjects. (shrink)

Despite a “spatial imaginary” which constructs Europe as a location of sexual and gender freedom (Rao, 2014), presently, twenty countries in Europe require sterilisation in order to legally recognise transgender people’s gender identities, including four of the seven countries in the INFERCIT study: Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Cyprus (but not Spain, which since 2007 does not require sterilisation for gender identity recognition [see Platero, 2008]. In Bulgaria and Lebanon no gender identity recognition for trans people is provided by law; the (...) latter lies outside the “European” region) (TGEU, 2014). Compulsory sterilisation—classified as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (UN General Assembly, 1998: art. 7.1)—is widely in force against transgender people, who constitute “the only known group in Europe subject to legally prescribed, state-enforced sterilisation” (Hammarberg, 2009: 19). However, forced sterilisation of trans people is not generally conceptualised as a eugenicist or genocidal policy, in part because sterilisation is conflated with gender reassignment surgical interventions which, widely considered as that which brings transgender bodies into being, are in turn conflated with embodied transgender subjectivities. On this view, transgender individuals could not exist except through a medicalised process that, by design, precludes their “natural” reproductive capacities and is generally not accompanied by fertility preservation or the provision of assisted reproduction technologies (Plemons, 2014: 38; De Sutter et al., 2002; De Sutter, 2001). Sterilisation laws are justified through a pathologising discourse on transgender lives which constructs gender reassignment interventions as medical “treatment” of gender identity disorder (Suess, Espineira & Crego Walters, 2014: 73-76). Adopting a depathologising perspective enables us to contextualise compulsory sterilisation (which naturalises the sexually dimorphic, cisgender, heterosexual body) as a form of “gendercide” which has historically been instrumental in the imposition of a Euro-colonial binary gender system (Miranda, 2010; Lugones, 2007). The state-imposition of medical interventions on trans people not only has deleterious effects on their reproductive rights, “effectively undermin[ing] their right to found a family” (Hammarberg, 2009: 21; see OHCHR et al., 2014)—as “family” is hegemonically defined by a heteronormative and bio/ logical kinship order (Butler, 2002; van Anders, 2014). I argue that state regulation of transgender reproduction constitutes a form of institutionalised gendered violence inasmuch as it impedes transgender people’s ability to exercise inherent first-person authority over the materiality and meanings of their gendered embodiments (Bettcher, 2009; Spade, 2013). Efforts to renaturalise gender and kinship inextricably intersect (Kantsa, 2006) in the biopolitical attempt to regulate transgender embodiments and reproduction, which conditions the emerging legal recognition of transgender subjects as a rights-bearing minority (Stryker, 2014). (shrink)

This timely work brings together a group of the nation's leading experts in genetics, medicine, history of science, health, law, philosophy of science, and medical ethics to assess the current state of modern human genetics, and to begin to chart the legal and ethical guidelines needed to prevent the misuse of human genetics from leading to the abuse of human beings. The six sections of the book, read together, map the social policy con tours of modern human genetics. The first (...) part describes the science of the Human Genome Project. The second addresses specific social policy implications, including the relevance of recombinant DNA history, the eugenics legacy, military applications, and issues of race and class in the context of genetic discrimination. Broader philosophical issues, including reductionism and determinism, the concept of disease, and using germline gene therapy to "improve" human beings are discussed in the third part. (shrink)

Two influential approaches to conceptualising the relationship between public and private law have suggested that the distinction between them should be abandoned. The first, as exemplified by Oliver, suggests that the distinction should be abandoned in favour of fusion based on the notion of commonality. The second, as exemplified by Teubner, rejects fusion, arguing for the replacement of the distinction with a concept capturing the multi-dimensional complexity of law in multiple social contexts: `polycontexturality'. This article focuses primarily on exploring conceptual (...) puzzles presented by Oliver's `commonality thesis', and argues for a reconceptualisation of the relationship between public and private law as multi-layered. Monolithic and rigidly binary concepts alike should be replaced by a complex set of relationships – a position broadly supportive of Teubner's. However, it is argued that the relationships between public and private law are to be seen as existing on a spectrum, or even on an overarching meta-spectrum, in which the existence of distinctive `archetypal conceptual paradigms' influence as `meta-spectrum extremities'. This presents a limited caveat to Teubner's thesis. I suggest that explicit theoretical attention to both the implications of polycontexturality and the existence of the archetypal conceptual paradigms as meta-spectrum extremities might avoid occluding important distinctions and nuances within a fusion that tends illegitimately to subsume private law within a public law paradigm. Such an analysis, I argue, could enhance the coherence of the law in complex, multi-dimensional cases at the troubled borderline between public and private law. (shrink)

Louise Brown's birth in 1978 heralded a new era not just in reproductive technology, but in the relationship between science, cells, and society. For the first time, human embryos could be created, selected, studied, manipulated, frozen, altered, or destroyed, outside the human body. But with this possibility came a plethora of ethical questions. Is it acceptable to destroy a human embryo for the purpose of research? Or to create an embryo with the specific purpose of destroying it for research? In (...) an attempt to construct ethical and legal frameworks for the new era of cellular reprogramming, legislators and ethicists have tried to distinguish between different kinds of biological entity. We treat cells differently depending on whether they are human or animal, somatic cells or gametes, and on whether they are embryos or not. But this approach to the ethics of cellular reprogramming is doomed to failure for the simple reason that cellular reprogramming in itself destroys the distinctions that the law requires to function. In this article, we explore the historical trajectory of cellular reprogramming and its relationship with ethics and society. We suggest that the early hype of embryo research has not obviously fulfilled expectations, but since new avenues of research are continuously opening, it is hard to say definitely that these promises have been broken. We explore the forthcoming challenges posed by the creation of DNA from scratch in the laboratory, and the implications of this for understandings of identity, privacy, and reproduction. We conclude that while ethics used to seek answers in biological facts, this is no longer possible, and a new approach is required. (shrink)

Many reports independently confirm that even more than a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the results of research and development in those countries that were under its influence are insufficient in comparison to the rest of the world. Given that human intelligence is not distributed unevenly and that science is a powerful driving force for the future of an economy, there is a hidden problem, which, if it can be resolved, may release great economic (...) potential. The first generation of researchers from Armenia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovakia and Ukraine, who successfully completed their education after the political revolution, were surveyed. The survey revealed many similarities with regards to ethics, but that there is mounting evidence that the main cause of the current situation is the state of the local legal systems. The conclusion was drawn that a conceptual change in staffing within the relevant legal systems is required to release potential and stimulate wealth creation. (shrink)

Stanisław Brzozowski formulated the ideal of modern man in the polemic with the contemporary man, who has ceased to believe in truth and moral values and is devoid of the will to act. For Brzozowski modernity involves the discovery of truth about the human condition: about man as an autonomous subject, a creator of values, who struggles with non-human reality. This truth was formulated in Kant’s idea of autonomy and in Marx’ idea of a collective conquest of the world of (...) nature. For Brzozowski, ideal modern man is “the conscious labourer,” who labours because he wants to proudly impose a human law on the non-human world. At the same time Brzozowski used the term “modernity” to describe life of constant change in the modern world, understood as a set of results of man’s reign over nature. For the sake of human maturity, Brzozowski expected the truly modern man to perceive modern life as an unquestionable value. Undoubtedly, there is an evident tension in Brzozowski’s ideal of modern man between the affirmation of creativity in the world of change and the necessity of disciplined production, including unchangeable moral foundations of labour. There is also a major shift in this ideal, stemming from Brzozowski’s change of attitude towards religion. (shrink)

In the debate over moral bioenhancement, some object that biochemical, genetic, and neurological interventions aiming at enhancing moral agency threaten the autonomy of persons, as they compromise moral deliberation and motivation. Opponents of this view argue that such interventions may actually enhance autonomy itself, thereby increasing a person's capacity for moral agency. My aim is to explore the various senses of autonomy commonly appealed to in such controversies and to expose their limitations in resolving the central disputed issues. I propose (...) that a Kantian conception of autonomy is more effective in addressing these issues, as it specifies the key features that inform an intelligible account of moral worth and moral law. A consideration of these features is typically lacking in the arguments advanced by contenders in these debates. Guided by a Kantian framework, I argue that moral bioenhancement projects directed at affecting moral autonomy are not as promising as they appear, for both metaphysical and empirical reasons. (shrink)

Action and Appearance is a collection of essays that look into the crucial and complex link between action and appearance in Hannah Arendt's political thought.Contributed by respected scholars, the essays articulate around the following themes: the emergence of political action when questioning the nature of law, subjectivity and individuality; the relationship between ethics and politics; the nexus of appearance, thinking and truth; and Arendt's writing as action and appearance. For Arendt, action is a worldly, public phenomenon that requires the presence (...) of others to have any effect. Therefore, to act is more than to decide as it is also to appear. Much has been said about Arendt's theory of action, but little attention has been paid to her approach to appearance as is done in this volume.Action and Appearance explores both Arendt's familiar texts and previously unpublished or recently rediscovered texts to challenge the established readings of her work. Adding to established debates, it will be a unique resource to anyone interested in Hannah Arendt, political thought, political theory, and political philosophy. (shrink)

OF SENSES AND PERCEPTION—WHAT SMITH TELLS US ABOUT BERKELEY AND VICE VERSA Adam Smith’s epistemology, described primarily in the essay Of the External Senses, was strongly inspired by George Berkeley’s thought expressed in his New Theory of Vision (1709). Both philosophers distinguished between the Objects of Sight and the Objects of Touch and analyzed the perception of distance between objects and size of objects (Berkeley’s thorough analysis was limited to the sense of sight, whereas Smith described also the features of (...) other senses.). They also noticed the observer’s role in the process. Both philosophers made a parallel between their epistemology and moral/ social theories. However, their conclusions turned out to be quite different, despite some similarities in their views on the problem of external senses. Smith focused on the issue of sympathy and the Impartial Spectator, and underlined the fact that our moral judgements are strongly altered by our relation to those who are judged and that we learn how to give opinions on the basis of how others judge our behaviour. Berkeley, on the other hand, focused on the role of laws and reason in both epistemological and moral judgements. Keywords: ADAM SMITH, GEORGE BERKELEY, EPISTEMOLOGY, MORAL/SOCIAL THEORIES. (shrink)

International law holds that states are holistically responsible for their acts. Yet what does the ascription of responsibility to the state imply about the responsibility of its citizens? This article argues that most citizens in a representative democracy bear culpability in association with their state's wrongful acts. Most democratic citizens can be blamed for empowering representatives to act on their behalf, and then failing to adequately oversee and dissent from the specific wrongful decisions their representatives made. This gives culpable citizens (...) duties that go beyond compensation, especially duties to foster a reparative social ethos towards state victims. (shrink)

This article presents both the legal regulations concerning lobbying in Poland and an evaluation of lobbying practices. It makes reference to the results of sociological research conducted among Polish members of Parliament, professional lobbyists and journalists who cover parliamentary issues. The research was conducted in cooperation with the S. Batory Foundation’s Anti-Corruption Program from May to July 2008.

De nos jours, les avocats et les juristes chinois sont très friands d'Internet. Pourtant, leur utilisation de la Toile n'a pas encore été l'objet de recherches. Cet article veut apporter un regard nouveau sur le lien entre avocats, internautes et société civile chinoise. Les juristes ont trouvé en Internet, en particulier sur les blogs, un lieu d'information et d'échange où ils peuvent se dédier aux sujets qui les intéressent . Les multiples démarches qu'ils ont initiées au sein du Réseau ont (...) abouti à une mobilisation des moyens numériques, permettant de mieux communiquer et informer sur le système légal et judiciaire chinois. Leur utilisation d'Internet a-t-elle catalysé l'initiative personnelle des utilisateurs et mobilisé l'opinion publique ? Cet article s'attache à démontrer comment par le biais d'Internet les avocats ont pu être des acteurs du développement de la société civile et participer ainsi à l'émergence d'une « communauté de critères » relevant du droit.Nowadays, lawyers and jurists Chinese are very fond of the Internet. However, their use of the Internet has not yet been investigated. This article will provide a new perspective on the relationship between lawyers, surfers and Chinese civil society. Lawyers found in the Internet, especially on blogs, a place to exchange information and where they can devote themselves to topics that interest them . Multiple steps they have initiated within the network led to a mobilization digital means to better communicate and inform the Chinese legal and judicial system. Internet use did catalyzed users personal initiative and mobilized public opinion? This article aims to demonstrate how through Internet lawyers have been involved in development of civil society and thus contribute to the emergence of a "community standards" under the law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Women and Health Research:A Report from the Institute of MedicineAnna C. Mastroianni (bio), Ruth Faden (bio), and Daniel Federman (bio)In recent years, claims have been made by segments of the research community and by women's health advocacy groups that clinical research practices and policies have not benefitted women's health to the same extent as men's health. Central to these claims has been an assertion that women have been inadequately (...) represented as subjects of clinical studies and that as a result neither health conditions unique to women—e.g., menopause—nor women's manifestations of health problems affecting both sexes—e.g., heart disease—have been investigated sufficiently.The scientific community, including federal agencies that sponsor and regulate clinical studies, is increasingly responsive to these claims and is taking steps to raise the level of women's participation in clinical studies. Controversy and concern have surrounded these actions, however. Two of the claims that have been made are: (1) that women are more difficult to study than men because of their cyclical hormonal changes; and (2) that conducting gender-specific subgroup analyses would increase the size of study populations, raise the cost of studies, and thereby reduce the number of studies that could be performed with the limited resources available. In addition, controversy over the inclusion of women of childbearing potential and pregnant women has been particularly salient. Concerns have been expressed about avoiding potential harm to existing or potential fetuses and about the possible legal and financial ramifications of such harm. A further concern involves the perceived difficulties in enrolling women in studies and retaining them for the duration of the studies.Against this backdrop, the Office of Research on Women's Health at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in October 1992 to establish the Committee on the Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies. The Committee's charge was to: (1) consider the ethical and legal implications of including women, particularly pregnant women and women of childbearing potential, in clinical studies; (2) examine known instances of litigation regarding injuries to research subjects [End Page 55] and describe existing legal liabilities and protections; and (3) provide practical advice on these issues for consideration by NIH, institutional review boards (IRBs), and clinical investigators.The 16 Committee members came from diverse backgrounds: bioethics, law, epidemiology and biostatistics, public health policy, obstetrics and gynecology, clinical research, pharmaceutical development, social and behavioral sciences, and clinical evaluative sciences.1 Chaired by two of the authors of this article, Ruth Faden and Daniel Federman, and coordinated by the third, IOM Study Director Anna Mastroianni, the Committee met five times over a fourteen-month period, convened a one-and-one-half day invitational workshop, and commissioned several background papers. The Committee's deliberations were complicated by the announcement of new federal policies late in its term. Specifically, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidelines (FDA 1993) to replace its 1977 guidelines, which prohibited the inclusion of women of childbearing potential in early phases of most clinical drug trials. In addition, Congress passed the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-43), which contains provisions mandating the inclusion of women and racial and ethnic minorities in NIH-sponsored clinical research. In February 1994, the IOM Committee publicly issued its final report and recommendations, Women and Health Research: Ethical and Legal Issues of Including Women in Clinical Studies, publishing the workshop presentations and commissioned papers in a separate volume.Deliberations of the CommitteeA number of issues arose at the outset as the Committee considered its charge. A few members initially believed that verification of the underrepresentation of women relative to men in clinical studies as a whole was a prerequisite to providing policy recommendations. Others believed that such an examination would be an important contribution to the knowledge base, but that it was not necessary for addressing the Committee's charge. As summarized in the Committee's report, the Committee's research indicated that firm conclusions about the relative underrepresentation of women could not be drawn from the available data because of the lack of systematic information... (shrink)

This chapter sets out to briefly introduce the theory of the legal form as originally conceived by Evgeny Pashukanis, a famous early Soviet legal scholar. Firstly, it will provide an account of Pashukanis's life, tragically cut short during the Great Terror. Secondly, it will move onto summarising his theory of the legal form through three theses: (i) Commodity Form Thesis, (ii) Bourgeois Law Thesis, and (iii) Withering Away Thesis. Thirdly, it will compare these theses to the positions on law and (...) state advanced by his various interlocutors, past and contemporary, namely Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Petr Stuchka, and Andrey Vyshinsky. Fourthly, it will analyse the similarities and differences identified in the previous section, drawing conclusions as to the cause of Pashukanis's downfall. It will be eventually pointed out that Pashukanis's theory was fundamentally unsuitable to the project of Soviet state-building, which explains why viewing law and state from Pashukanist lens was contested and eventually abandoned. (shrink)

This reflection contrasts the dominant imaginary underlying ‘lawofthe Anthropocene’ with an imaginary reaching towards ‘law/sforthe Anthropocene’. It does so primarily by contrasting two imaginaries of human embodiment—law’s existing imaginary of quasi-disembodiment and an alternative imaginary of embodiment as co-woven with the lively incipiencies and tendencies of matter. It draws on ‘transcorporeality’ and ‘sympoiesis’ as inspiration for ‘sympoietic normativities’ as ways of co-living and co-organizing in the face of the catastrophic implications of the Anthropocene emergency.

The concept of ‘pareto superiority’ plays a central role in ethics, economics, and law. Pareto superiority is sometimes taken as a relation between outcomes, and sometimes as a relation between actions—even where the outcomes of the actions are uncertain. Whether one action is classed as (ex ante) pareto superior to another depends on the prospects under the actions for each person concerned. I argue that a person’s prospects (in this context) can depend on how that person is designated. Without any (...) constraints on acceptable designators, then, the concept of pareto superiority is ill defined and gives inconsistent results. I consider various ways of completing the definition and draw out some surprising implications. (shrink)

Abstract:While self-determination is a cardinal principle of international law, its meaning is often obscure. Yet international law clearly recognizes decolonization as a central application of the principle. Most ordinary people also agree that the liberation of colonial peoples was a moral triumph. This essay examines three philosophical theories of self-determination’s value, and asks which one best captures the reasons why decolonization was morally required. The instrumentalist theory holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples were unjustly governed, the democratic view (...) holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples lacked democratic representation, and the associative view holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples were unable to affirm the political institutions their colonial rulers imposed on them. I argue that the associative view is superior to competing accounts, because it better reflects individuals’ “maker” interests in participating in shared political projects that they value. The essay further shows that if we accept the associative view, self-determination is not a sui generis value that applies to decolonization alone. Ultimately, our intuitions about decolonization can be justified only by invoking an interest on the part of persistently alienated groups in redrawing political boundaries. The same interest may justify self-determination in additional cases, such as autonomy for indigenous peoples, or greater independence for Scotland or Quebec. (shrink)

Executive Summary There is a general perception that biomedical research has not given the same attention to the health problems of women that it has given ...

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the largest regional security and cooperation organization and has existed for nearly two decades. Since its inception China and Russia have acted as the driving force behind it, playing a leading role in its development. The main goals of the Big Two’s cooperation are to ensure the Eurasian corridor is developed, to promote collective security through regional cooperation organizations, including the United Nations, and to recast the world order on the basis of political dialogue, mutual (...) respect, equality and international law. Nonetheless there are disagreements between China and Russia and among the member states. China is keen to tackle terrorism, extremism and separatism and pursue economic collaboration, while Russia is more ambitious about transforming the SCO into a strategic counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. Looking forward, people may wonder how China, a rising economic power and military force, will continue to share liabilities within the SCO, particularly with Russia but also the other member states. There is no definite answer to that question at the moment. All we can say is that the SCO has steadily evolved into one of the most multilateral and dynamic organizations. But if progress is to be sustained, reforms and systematic change are necessary. (shrink)